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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CECIL WOODARD, 
Pl.u . ; .: ,1 Appellant, 
u. nyFN': - • •: , 
Defendant and Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
RICHARD SEVERIN and ) 
MRS. RICHARD SEVERIN ) 
Third-Party uefen>!* ; > 
and Respondents. 
REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Thi° ^ri^f • s <.-. . n compliance vith Rule N~ . '„"".-s 
of the Rules ui the .'-upreme Court r reply f rhe -.rgument .' *"e 
respondents i.r -heir orie: '•-• • ;• 
certiorari- parties art named > i *• .^-i tion diic arc referred 
to by nanu . 
ISSUE RAISED BY BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
" respondents' bri e :n oppositi n raises one question 
-- 'Vtt:c; appellant Woodard is i-;nr i .: :o re tor" an option 
agreement _.._„• <* deed for conveyance oi real ,•: . ,• •• . ; 
SUPREME COURT NO. 20016 
COURT OF APPEALS 
CASE NO. 860037-CA 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Under the heading "Statement of the Case", in the brief 
in opposition (page 2), the September 21, 1972, Agreement is 
described as an "option agreement" which erroneously described 
the land in dispute, and it is stated that "Woodard never exer-
cised the option. Jensen subsequently sold the parcel to respon-
dent Severin". 
This statement of the case is erroneous and misleading. 
It ignores the facts that Woodard paid $7,000.00 cash on the land 
(R. 290), delivered 6,000 shares of stock to the seller on the 
date of the agreement (R. 291), and later delivered title to a 
truck to Jensen. (See Exhibit 21-P and R. 291-294) Additional 
facts showing the intention of the parties are set forth in the 
petition for certiorari and will not be repeated here. 
ARGUMENT 
_K 
THE AGREEMENT AS CONSTRUED BY THE PARTIES 
IS NOT AN OPTION, BUT IS A LEGALLY 
ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. 
In line with the issue stated in the opposition brief, 
quoted above, whether Woodard is entitled to ...."reform an option 
agreement into a deed of conveyance of real property", it is 
argued by Severin, on page 2, that "Plaintiff's whole case from 
the beginning, has been to have the Trial Court, then the Appeals 
Court, and now this Court reform an Option Agreement into a deed." 
Then, after quoting part of the Agreement, it is again repeated, 
2 
"What appellant is asking for i-~ ? ' r ri • s Agreement be r~ii ^'-^
 p 
oi i t1 " i in I • •* ;. -yance and then rar-
ing lot specific performance of that conveyance." 
This argumen* i •> v- li" v;uiuut support I»v t. h*j rn onl• 
.*-.: .:... > W,H: t-h° evidence and was made by 
Severin for the first time i\ he opposition brief, Woodard's 
third party complaint alienee mi si \l°v in i In i|» retM'n ni whi ch 
. . , sought reformation of the agreement as reformed, 
further sought ^ .^rder reciiring Severi" who *idu nutlet 
the agreen * ini 
I:.e parties i- r.\o agreement 'e-^-n aru; Woodard, from 
tru- beginning treated trie agreement as « 5 r*c : . t 
••?a*'.': o f" of the pm-onas pru.t
 t ^e:.<e;. 
accepted the money and helped Woodard builc .: H O U M O:. t ne I r ^ 
the summer following the ua;^ * *-<•-* 
Jensen ii:ed a thirw i>c» i L S complaint against Severir in 
which he alleged that he hac }i . . .mistakenly and erroneously 
veyed riv- - - :*•- :n and to tK- subject real prop-
erty to LUL L?: i r.i pd i ' defendants nno - irtiw- alleged that the 
plaintiff's interest * hp 1 r -i : *- -ireriur *. -cvrrinN i • 
•^« v. - > :! - .u.-.i -:.isfake "K the agreement i-. 
: ^  • ntr legal description. As indicated above, Jensen pleaded that 
the mistake was conveying to Severin tin Q.^ TH> land ^ lie had 
i - ; •eJ 1o sell to Woodard. 
3 
The argument of Severin that the agreement was not in-
tended as a conveyance is beside the point. Woodard and Jensen 
never contended that it was a deed. They considered it a suffi-
ciently binding contract of sale for Woodard to pay $11,800.00 on 
the purchase price, to take possession, and to build a cabin on 
the land in dispute. (R. 290-297) 
2^ 
FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON ALL MATERIAL ISSUES 
WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The opposition brief argues that the reason the trial 
court made no findings of fact and conclusions of law on the 
issues of (a) mutual mistake, (b) intent of the parties to the 
agreement, (c) who had possession, (d) whether Severin had actual 
notice, and (e) estoppel, was that the trial court never had to 
deal with the mutual mistake issue "....because the option agree-
ment is not a deed, it does not convey property...." (opposition 
brief, p. 5) (emphasis added) The obvious answer to this argument 
is that neither Woodard or Jensen intended the agreement to be a 
deed. They intended it to be and from the beginning treated it 
as a contract of sale. 
The thrust of the equity suit is to have the court 
determine the intent of the agreement and when that is deter-
mined, to reform the agreement and order specific performance. 
The trial court made no findings and conclusions on these issues 
and others. 
4 
CONCLUSION 
The opposition brief has not met the arguments in the 
petition tor wri" <f cf-rrinr-i.-i . >'<u tue cuiitrary '-.:-.; 
a lutal iLisappr-- • eaninp of the agreement, ar, i the 
intentions of the parties. lue same .; true of tut o^i^ior. „L 
the Court of Appeals. 
I' i >• respectfully submitted that the petition for the 
writ should be granted. 
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